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The purpose of this article is to consider a two firms excess-loss reinsur3r,ce problem. The 
first firm is defined as the direct underwriter while the second firm is the reinsurer. As in the 
classical model of collective risk theory it is assumed that premium payments are received 
deterministically from policyholders at a constant rate, while the claim process is determined by 
a compound Poisson process. The objective of the underwriter is to maximize the expected 
present value of the long run terminal wealth (investments plus cash) of the firm by selecting 
an appropriate excess-loss coverage strategy, while the r5nsurer seeks to maximize its total 
expected discounted profit by selecting an optimal loading factor. Since both firms’ policies are 
interdependent we define an insurance game, solved by employing a Stackelberg solution concept. 
A diffusion approximation is used in order to obtain tractable results for a general claim size 
distribution. Finally, an example is presented illustrating computational procedures. 
1. Introduction 
The reinsurance contract between insurance ffirms is one of the essential instru- 
ments such firms have used to distribute and reduce risk. A great deal of attention 
has thus been devoted to perfecting these contracts both in theory and practice. 
A reinsurance contract is essentially an insurance policy issued by one companv- 
the reinsurer-to another company, usually called the ceding company of the direcf 
underwriter. There are three forms of reinsurance arrangements: (a) proportional 
reinsurance, (b) stop-loss reinsurance and (c) excess-loss reinsurance (see [ 1, Part 
11). A series of papers in the reinsurance area has been written by Borch [l]. The 
optimal reinsurarce treaty was examined also by Vajda [14], ayananda [31 and 
others. Most of t:lese models have considered a static structure, except for 
ananda [3] who deals with a proportional reinsurance odel. The purpose o 
article is to consider a dynamic optimal excess-loss reinsurance treaty. 
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As in the classical theory of collective risk, we shall assume that premium 
payments are received deterministically from policyholders while the claim process 
is determined by a compound Poisson process. Under an excess-loss (reinsurance) 
contract the ceding firm is responsible for covering claims if they are smaller than 
or equal to a fixed critical point, say 4. If the claim magnitude xceeds 5 the whole 
excess will be paid by the reinsurer. In return the ceding firm will transfer a part 
of its expected profit to the reinsurer. The premium rate transferred from the ceding 
firm to the reinsurer is given as (1 + k) times the expected claim rate covered by 
the reinsurer where k is referred to as the loading factor of the reinsurer. A 
reinsurance arrangement is determined by the two dimensional vector (5, k). Since 
both firms’ policies are interdependent we define an insurance game describing the 
bargaining problem of the two companies. 
In Section 2 we outline in detail the stochastic model faced by both firms-the 
ceding firm and the reinsurer. Section 3 contains a precise description of the 
objective functions of the two firms. A diffusion approximation is used in order to 
obtain tractable results for a general claim size distribution. In Section 4 we define 
an insurance game solved by employing a Stackelberg solution concept. Finally, 
an example is presented illustrating computational procedures. 
2. The reinsurance stochastic model 
We consider first the problem as seen from the ceding firm’s point of view. As 
in the classical model of collective risk theory it is assumed that premium payments 
are received from policyholders deterministically at a constant rate. Claims occur 
according to a Poisson process with rate A. Successive claim magnitudes Y1, Y2, . . . , 
are assumed to be positive independent and identically distributed random variables 
having a known distribution function 6;( l ). Throughout the paper we assume that 
Fi .) possesses a finite second moment. Apart from that we shall impose no 
restrictions on the support and on the functional form of the claim size distribution. 
The claim process (without reinsurance) is therefore a compound Poisson process 
with mean rate 
p=A0 (1) 
where 
I 
00 
8 = u dF(u). 
0 
Let (b be the rate of premium payments received from policyhol.ders. The relation- 
ship between the premium process and the claim process is given by 
4 = M(1 +S), (3) 
where S 2 0 is the loading factor, use (t) be the ceding 
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firm’s cumulative income (without reinsurance) over the time interval (0, rj, describ- 
ing excess insurance premiums collected over claims. Then we have 
X(t) = & - (Y1+ ’ ’ l + YN;J, (4) 
where {N(t); t 3 0) is a Poisson process with arrival rate A, 
We now proceed to describe the reinsurance stochastic model when a reinsurance 
arrangment (6, k) is employed. It can be seen that the actual claim process associated 
with the ceding firm is a compound Poisson process with a Poisson parameter A 
and distribution function 
Similarly, the claim process associated with the reinsurer is also a compound Poisson 
process having a Poisson parameter A and distribution function 
F;(x)= 
0 if x < 0, 
F(x+[) if x SO. 
(6) 
Let (Y~,,Ll and (Y&L1 be the actual claim magnitudes paid by the ceding 
firm and the reinsurer, respectively. For i = 1, ? Yi.1, Y&, . . . is a sequence of 
independent identically distributed random variables having a distribution function 
Fi ( 9 ). Clearly, 
y:.n +y&l = Yn. for n 2 1 
where Y1, Y2, . . . are the magnitudes of successive claims. The relationship among 
the above three random sequences is given by 
Let e,,(t) be the nth moment associated with the distribution function 
i = 1,2. Then the premium rate transferred from the cedmg firm to the reinsurer 
is given by 
42(& w = ~~2,lWU + u. 
On the other hand, the net premium rate collected %y the ceding firm usin 
loading factor 8 is given by 
Let X1 and X2 be t cumulative into e processes of t 
reinsurer, respectively ssuming that a r surance arrangment 
88 C.S. Tapiero, D. Zuckerman / Optimum excess-loss reinsurance 
we have 
X2(t) = #2x-, kb - c YZ,* + l ’ l + Y:.N(r) 1 
where {N(t); t 3 0) is a Poisson process with arrival rate A. 
(9) 
(10) 
3. The objective functions 
This section contains a precise de!;cription of the decision variables and the 
objective functions of the two firms. 
3.1. The ceding firm 
An important ingredient in the model is a conversion mechanism of funds from 
the cash balance into investments and vice versa. More explicitly, funds from the 
cash balance can be transferred into investments at a transaction cost of b for each 
monetary unit converted from cash into investments. To avoid trivialities we assume 
that b < 1. Similarly, when the firm transfers funds from investments into the cash 
balance a proportional transaction cost of d is incurred. We assume that investments 
yield a rate of return of r. Thus holding cash at level x > 0 incurs an opportunity 
coqt of EL For the sake of simplicity we assume that funds transferred from cash 
into investments are invested in riskless bonds continuously earning interest at 
rate r. The firm’s assets (cash plus investments) are supposed to be sufficiently i urge 
to make ultimate ruin under any policy worthy for consideration a negligible 
possibility. 
The decision makisr continually and costlessly observes the cash level and inter- 
venes when necessary to adjust the cash balance. An optimal cash management 
policy describes an economic balance between the opportunity cost on liquid funds 
and the transaction costs. As it will be seen later in thy paper, under the assumptions 
of our model, investments will be transferred into cash only whenever the cash 
balance decreases to zero. Although the possibility of ultimate ruin is negligible 
there are several complications whenever the cash level decreases to zero, such as 
delays in payments, decreased insured security, etc. These indirect losses have to 
be included in d. 
We believe that while the cash management model described above is far from 
being perfect, it represents a realistic situation for an insurance firm assets. 
The objective of the ceding firm is to maximize the expected present value of 
the long run terminal wealth (investments plus cash) of the firm by selecting an 
excess-loss coverage strategy [ as well as determining an optimal cash management 
policy, under the restriction that the cash balance must be non-negative at any 
oint of time which is a continuity point of the cash level process. 
Before proceeding, in order to o’3tain a better insight int 
ante, it is important to indicate that when an in 
for reinsurance it seeks to reduce the probabilit 
and in return the company will forego part 
assumption of risk aversion on the part of the c 
ante arrangement the firm decreases the varia 
of its expected profit will have to be passed t
one-stage ruin reinsurance model in [ 1, C 
determined according to the utility functions 
attitude toward risk. In our reinsurance model the ce 
function of the form U’(x) = x which indicates 
ante is motivated by the objective to obtain 
process, and as a result the firm reduces its conversion costs, 
Our goal now is to derive an explicit expression for the 
ceding firm and to characterize the structure of an optimal 
In order to obtain tractable results for a general claim sit 
approximation is used. The idea of approximating jump p 
drift by diffusion processes with continuous paths is not r 
in genetics (see [4]) and in certain congestion models j 
diffusion approximation to the theory of collective risk were proposed by several 
researchers. Iglehart [lc1] examined a collective risk model in which the prem 
rate is constant over time and the claim process is a compound renewal process. 
Iglehart obtained a diffusion approximation for the capital rc’serve of the 
by applying the theory of weak convergence of probability mc~~es. 
paper which uses weak convergence of measures in order to obtain 
approximations for collective risk models is [7] by Gluckman. This paper 
also the rate of convergence of the approximating processes En a ret 
Harrison [8] proved an approximation theorem for a risk process with c8m 
assets. More explicitly, Harrison examined the classical made! treated by 
moditied by the assumption that interest is earned continuously on capital at a 
known rate, while the cJaim process is assumed to be a compound 
Using results obtained in previous studies, we propose a difiusis 
for the stochastic process X1, describing the cumulative income of th 
Such an approximation is reached as follows: Let 41, CXI WI be an i 
X1 process accrued over the time interval (E, I -+ h 1. That is, 
A,,(X,(t)) = X,(t + tr 1 -X1(t). 
Consider the following :‘imits: 
and 
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Using known properties of the compound Poisson process we obtain 
bh = 4d& k) - m,d0 (11) 
and 
Denote by c.&(t); t 2 0) the diffusion process having initial position J&(O) = 0, whose 
drift parameter and diffusion parameter are specified by ~1 and (+f, respectively. 
Then the theory of diffusion approximations uggests that under reasonable assump- 
tions the process X1 can be approximated by the diffusion process 21. For this 
approximation to be valid it is necessary that the claim size will be small compared 
to the scale of the process while the premium rate and claim arrival rate have to 
be large. Most important is that the validity of the approximation does not depend 
on either the s,upport or the functional form of the claim size distribution. In what 
follows we shall assume that the cumulative income process of the ceding firm is 
determined by the diffusion process 2, defined above, and therefore one has to 
consider the diffusion optimization model suggested by us as an approximation for 
the original optimization problem faced b:y the ceding firm. 
Let Q(t) be the cumulative amount of funds transferred from cash into invest- 
ments up to time t and Z(t) be the cumulative amount of cash generated by sale 
of bonds over the time interval (0, t). A cash management policy (Q, 2) is said to 
be permissible if 
W~t)=x+~l(f)-Q(t)+Z(t)~O a.s. (13) 
for all t >O, where x is the initial cash level. Note that under any given cash 
management policy the stochastic processes Q, 2 and W depend upon the reinsur- 
ante arrangement (5, k) (see (11) and (12)). 
Let B(t) be the amount of investments at time f. The objective of the ceding 
firm is to maximize the expected value of the random quantity 
lim eerT(B( a) + W(T)). 
T+oo 
Recalling that the ceding firm holds all its investments in riskless bonds earning an 
interest rate r (compounding continuously), it can be seen that 
B(t)=e”B(O)+(l-6) ‘e”‘--“lclQ(s)-(l+d) 
I I 
‘er”-“dZ(s). (14) 
0 0 
Let 7~ be the col%ection of all permissible cash management policies. Next we claim 
that under any policy r E V, worthy for consideration, the expected present value 
of the long rtin terminal cash value is zero. We will provide the main idea of the 
proof. Define a cash management policy r’~ 7~ as follows: convert investments 
into cash by the minimum iamount necessary to keep the cash level non-negative 
and never transfer fun s from cash into investments. Clearly, under any policy 
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k~ v worthy for consideration and for any value of W(0) 
E[ewrTW( T) 1 r’ is employed] 2 
> E[eerT W(T) 1 r is employed] 2 0 (15) 
for all T 2 0 independently of the reinsurance arrangment (6, k). But 
E Jimme 
[- 
-rTW( T) 1 r’ is employed 1 = 0 (16) 
and this completes the proof. 
Now, using (14), the objective function of the ceding firm under a reinsurance 
arrangement (6, k) and a cash management policy r can be expressed as follows 
Pt.(,S,k)=(1--b)E[~~e~‘“dQ(s)]-(1+d)E[~~e “dZ(s)] 
0 0 
(17) 
where x is the initial cash level. Note that the term B(0) is a constant and the:*efGre 
it can be omitted from the objective function. The objective function of the ceding 
firm can also be formulated in terms of opportunity loss on wealth held in cash as 
follows: Employing Fubini’s theorem it can be seen that 
J 
c-0 
dQ(r)-J 
m on 
e 
-rf e-” dZ(t) = r 
I) J e-"(Q(t) -Z(t)) dt 0 0
J 
cc 
=r e+[ w(o) +2,(t) - W(t)] dt. 
0 
(18) 
Observing that E[jr e--%l (t) dt] = 1; e-” pltdt=pI/r’ and using (18) we obtain 
that the right-hand side of (17) is equivalent to 
[I 
‘d 
W’(O)+~,/r--rE e-” W(t) dt 
0 I 
-bE [I: e-” dQ(t)] -dE[ $ ewrf dZ(t)]. 
Thus, the original objective function of the ceding fu-m is equivalent to the problem 
of maximizing the expected present value of the long run net gain less the expected 
present value of transaction costs and opportunity loss on wealth held as :as 
Let 
be the optima1 return under a reinsurance arrangement (5, k). The existence of an 
optimal cac,h management policy was established by Harrison and Taylor [9]. (See 
also [12] and [2]). Further, using previous studies (see [9], [2] and [12]), we can 
e structure of t al cash manage 
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under a given reinsurance arrangement (6, k), an optimal cash management policy 
has the following form: convert all incoming premiums directly into investments 
whenever the cash level reaches an upper level, say S, and transfer investments 
into cash by the minimum amount necessary to keep the cash level non-negative. 
Note that under the above policy the stochastic process W behaves as x1, 
modified by reflecting boundaries at 0 and S. Let 
q=(l+&)/(l-b). (1% 
-We proceed with the following results. 
Propo&tion 1. Under a reinsurance arrangement (6, k) 
PA& k)=A exp((y-P)x}--13 exp{-(r+p)x} for OGXSS, (20) 
~~(5,k)=~s(5,k)+(X-S) forx>S (21) 
where 
P = Plld, y - [(p2 + 2r)/cr:]“2, 
A = EexpW - 4 exp{-rSll/'[(y -PNexpWl -exp{--yS)ll, 
B = 14 exp{ySl- ew@SHlRr + P)Eexp{rS) - exphW, 
and S is the unique positive solution of 
(22) 
Proof. See [9, Proposition 3 and Theorem 21. 
Summarizing, for any reinsurance arrangment (6, k), the optimal return of the 
ceding firm can be expressed explicitly. Further, the decision problem of the ceding 
firm hzs been reduced to determining an excess-loss coverage strategly 6. So far we 
described the decision variables and the objective function of the ceding firm We 
next proceed to describe the behavior of the reinsurer. 
3.2. The reinsurer 
The objective of the reinsurer is to maximize its expected iscounted profit over 
an infinite planning horizon where profilt is defined as insurance premiums collected 
by the reinsurer less ‘claims. For the sake of simplicity the objective function is 
defined independently of the cash management policy used by the firm. It is 
important to note that usually reinsurnace firms are involved with several types of 
reinsurance treaties each having independent insurance schemes, and funds can be 
transferred from one activity to another without cost. 
The goal of the reinsurer is to select a loading factor k which will maximize its 
total expected iscounted profit over an infinite future. Note that the accumulateS 
profit over the time interval (0, t) under a reinsurance arrangement (5; le) is given 
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by X2(?). Thus, the objective function of the reinsurer is to maximize 
~7(5, k)=E emrr dXz( t) 
I (23) 
where t is th2 interest rate earned on riskless investments. Observing that X2 has 
stationary independent increments with 
ELWOI = kh(& k) -M2.d5)lt 
and 
Var[Xz(t)] = hf&,2(5) <: 00 
we obtain that 
In the next section we describe the manner in which the negotiations between 
the companies are conducted. The outcome of thes’e negotiations will be a pair 
([*, k*) which is optimal in the sense that both parties consider it as representing 
the best treaty they could obtain in the given situation. An insurance game is 
defined and solved by employing a Stackelberg solutionL concept. 
4. The game 
The ceding firm selects an excess-loss coverage strategy & and the reinsurer 
selects a loading factor k. The reinsurance problem can be written as follows: 
maximize 
5 %5 k), 
maximize ~(5, k). 
(25) 
Clearly (25) defines a non-zero sum game. We shaF1 confine our attention to games 
with complete and perfect information. A common+ used non-cooperative solution 
concept is the Nash equilibrium which safeguards each firm against any attempt of 
the other firm to further improve its performance (see [ 111). Such a solution assumes 
that when strategies have been calculated, they are announced at the same time. 
Under a Nash solution concep’i, for every stragegy e c 00 used by the ceding firm, 
the optimal response for the reinsurer is to determine an infinite loading factor 
(i.e., k = 00). Therefore, the pair (6, k) = (00, CO) is the unique Nash equilibrium 
strategy. Thus, a Nash solution approach leads to a no-treaty situation and therefore 
it is not applicable in our case. 
In reinsurance usually one of the firms, based Gn complete and perfect informa- 
tion, commits itself to an announced policy and then the second firm announces 
its strategy in response. Such a solution implies that one of the two firms is t 
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leader and the other a follower. A solution concept of this type is defined by 
Stackelberg srrategy (see [13] and [5]>. We shall assume that the reinsurer is the 
leader and dominates the game by imposing a solution which is favorable to itself. 
Explicitly, let e*(k) be the reaction-curve of the ceding firm. That is, for every k, 
t*(k) maximizes !P& k) with respect o [. The reinsurer is assumed to know the 
response function e*(k), and the optimlal oading factor k* is determined as follows, 
rl(t*(k*), k*> = mp v@W), k). 
The excess loss coverage strategy of the ceding firm is then given by 
r* = d,r*(k*). 
Since the parameter S representing the upper boundary of the cash process of :he 
ceding firm cannot be expressed explicitly as a function of 5 and k, t*(k) must be 
determined numerically. In the next section an example is presented to illustrate 
computational procedures. 
5. An example 
We consider a uniform claim size distribution over the interval (0, ‘1), so that 
F(u) = 
Qf ifO<u<l, 
! 1 if z.431. 
The expected claim magnitude is 8 = $, and under a s excess-loss coverage strategy 
we ha.ve 
and 
The premium rates 4i (i = 1,2) under a (6, k) reinsurance arrangment are given by 
&I@, k)=:A(l+N-Mh,,([)(l+k)=;h[(l+di)-(1 +k)(l-t)2], 
and 
42(5, k) = A&([)(1 + k) = $h(l+ k)(l -e)“. 
iffusion parameters ~1 and a: are (see (11) and (12)) 
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and 
c+: =hel,Z(e) = A[~*u2du+~2(l-C)]=*(S2-i~3). 
0 
Assume the following parameters: 
A =loo, s=O.2, r=O.l, b=O.OS, d=4. 
Using Proposition 1, the optimal total expected discounted profit of the ceding 
firm under a (6, k) reinsurance treaty can be expressed explicitly as a function of 
S where S satisfies (22). Employing numerical techniques, the reaction curve e*(k) 
can be obtained. The optimal strategy k* of the reinsurer is determined by maximiz- 
ing 7(6*(k), k). In Fig. 1 we illustrate the functional behavior of 5*(k) and 
q(s*(k), k) under the assumption that W(0) = 0. 
6 
4 
I.0 
0.0 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
C!O2 0.04 0.06 0.08 010 
Fig. 1. The functionai behavior of t*(k) and 11(5*(k), k ), 
The optimal reinsurance treaty is gi.ve;T by (&*, k*) = (0.289,0.031). At this point 
the profits are 
!F&*, k*) = 88.36 and q([*, k*) = 8.08. 
When 6 = 1 (i.e., no reinsurance), the ex 
terminal wealth of t e ceding firm i .21. Thus, by using reinsurance, the 
increases its termina wealth by 4.94 
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As in our example, usually the loading factor used by the reinsurer is smaller 
significantly than the loading factor used by the ceding firm. This is mainly due to 
the fact that normally the ceding firm operates under higher risk conditions. 
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